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HOT BENCH: A THEORY OF APPELLATE 
ADJUDICATION 
TERRY SKOLNIK* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court justices are talking. And they are talking more 
than ever during oral argument. The term “hot bench” implies that appellate 
judges engage in vibrant verbal exchanges with the parties during oral hearings. 
As part of the new oral argument, Supreme Court justices now speak more while 
the parties speak less, they interrupt both their colleagues and the parties (espe-
cially women) more frequently than in the past, and some of their questions ad-
vocate for positions rather than seek information. A hot bench raises crucial con-
cerns about the nature of oral argument and appellate judges’ role in a constitu-
tional democracy. This Article addresses those concerns and advances a theory 
about the connection between a hot bench and appellate adjudication. It provides 
a new account of how active hearings can promote certain functionalist and dem-
ocratic virtues of oral argument that cold benches and written decisions cannot. 
Appealing to asymmetric information theory in economics, this Article demon-
strates how judges form majorities through signaling and screening. A more well-
rounded account of a hot bench’s value, however, requires an examination of its 
vices as well as its virtues. This Article concludes by demonstrating why appel-
late judges must avoid particularly costly trade-offs and how they can do so. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, appellate judges’ increased caseload has 
resulted in drastic changes to the appellate adjudicative process.1 The number 
of cases filed before federal courts of appeals increased eleven-fold within a 
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 1 Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of Deci-
sion-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 659, 661 (2007). For a dis-
cussion of the effects of increased caseloads on the trial courts, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 391–414 (1982). 
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half-century2 and rose by over 650% between 1960 and 1983 alone.3 As case-
loads expanded, oral hearings before those courts declined,4 and the time ac-
corded for oral argument also decreased.5 As the frequency of hearings dimin-
ished, so too did reversal rates.6 Even the judges’ conduct during oral argument 
changed significantly.7 Supreme Court justices spent more time speaking, 
asked more questions, and increasingly advocated positions from the bench, 
while advocates spoke less and had less time to make their case.8 The era of 
the “new oral argument” was born as the Supreme Court evolved into an in-
creasingly hot bench.9 The term “hot bench” implies that appellate judges ar-
rive to hearings prepared, demonstrate awareness of the record and relevant 
case law, and engage in active dialogue with the advocates.10 Not only has the 
phenomenon of a hot bench become increasingly common, but it shows no 
signs of going away.11 The new oral argument raises fundamental concerns 
                                                                                                                           
 2 RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 37 (2013) (noting the eleven-fold increase in 
cases filed before appellate courts in fifty years). 
 3 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59 (rev. ed. 1996) (citing 
the 686% increase in cases filed before federal appellate courts). For a summary of the reasons for 
caseload expansion, see David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1145–47 (2002). Only since 2012 has the volume of appellate court filings 
declined. See Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. COURTS (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.us
courts.gov/news/2016/12/20/just-facts-us-courts-appeals [https://perma.cc/BYD2-VFU3].  
 4 See Joseph W. Hatchett & Robert J. Telfer III, The Importance of Appellate Oral Argument, 33 
STETSON L. REV. 139, 139 (2003) (noting the decline in oral arguments); Marin K. Levy, Judicial 
Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 414 (2013) (same). 
 5 Stephen L. Wasby, Oral Argument in the Ninth Circuit: The View from Bench and Bar, 11 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 21, 22 (1981). 
 6 See Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 
289 (2006) (noting a decline in reversal rates from 1945 to 2005); Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112–13, 1118 (2011) (discussing reversal rates and a decline in oral argu-
ments). 
 7 See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRI-
CAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 313 (2013) (discussing an “increase in the amount of speaking at 
oral argument by the Justices”); Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: 
Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, October Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 
1005, 1019–20 (“Justices in the older cases typically allowed counsel a substantial amount of time at 
the beginning of the argument to explain the background of the case . . . , whereas the Justices in the 
later cases typically began their questioning almost immediately . . . .”). 
 8 Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as Advocates, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1161, 1169 (2019). 
 9 See id. at 1168–78 (using the term “new oral argument” to describe the evolution in oral hear-
ings before the Supreme Court); Sullivan & Canty, supra note 7, at 1038 (using the same term); see 
also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 55 (2007) 
(detailing the rise of the hot bench). 
 10 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517, 523 
(2003). 
 11 See A.E. Dick Howard, The Changing Face of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L. REV. 231, 276 
(2015) (observing that two of the more recently appointed justices, Justices Sonia Sotomayor and 
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about appellate judges’ evolving role in a constitutional democracy, their legit-
imacy, and adjudication more generally.12 
This Article explores those concerns and advances a theory about the 
connection between a hot bench and appellate adjudication.13 Oral argument 
remains the most unfiltered, spontaneous, and visible aspect of judicial deci-
sion making; a transparency-promoting practice by which the public can judge 
its judges.14 Because many aspects of appellate decision making are shrouded 
in secrecy, stakeholders increasingly scrutinize oral hearings to hold judges 
accountable and determine whether justice is both done and seen to be done.15 
This Article builds on existing theories about the functionalist and democratic 
justifications for oral argument.16 By combining the insights of emerging em-
pirical research into oral hearings and theories of adjudication, it argues that a 
hot bench results in serious trade-offs. Appellate judges may promote certain 
functionalist and democratic values of oral argument while sacrificing others. 
To legitimize oral argument and a judges’ role in a democracy, appellate judges 
must minimize the vices of active oral hearings and avoid costly and unneces-
sary trade-offs. 
This Article is structured as follows. Part I sets out the history of oral ar-
gument, its evolution, and the rise of the hot bench in appellate adjudication.17 
Part II explores the traditional functionalist and democratic justifications for 
oral hearings and critiques those approaches in light of the rise to prominence 
of a hot bench.18 Part III provides a new account of the democratic virtues of 
active oral hearings that are attributable to greater empirical research into oral 
argument: transparency, the new judicial accountability, dialogue, and judicial 
minimalism.19 Part IV describes the functionalist benefits of a hot bench: op-
timizing the judiciary’s limited information-gathering capacities and assisting 
                                                                                                                           
Elena Kagan, are more likely than the justices that preceded them to ask questions and interrupt advo-
cates). 
 12 See Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democ-
racy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 21 (2002) (reflecting on the role of judges in democratic societies). 
 13 See Howard, supra note 11, at 275 (noting “oral arguments have undergone profound changes 
over the past five decades”). 
 14 See Michael J. Higdon, Oral Argument and Impression Management: Harnessing the Power of 
Nonverbal Persuasion for a Judicial Audience, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 631, 635 (2009) (discussing the 
importance of nonverbal aspects of oral arguments). 
 15 See Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Government, 
and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REV. 653, 661 (2001) (discussing the 
appearance of judicial bias). 
 16 See Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the Conven-
tional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (1986) (noting public oral arguments serve an accountability 
function). 
 17 See discussion infra Part I. 
 18 See discussion infra Part II. 
 19 See discussion infra Part III. 
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in the coalition-building process.20 The Article concludes by demonstrating 
why appellate judges must avoid sacrificing some democratic and functionalist 
values of oral hearings in the pursuit of others and suggests how they can do 
so.21 
I. ORAL ARGUMENT: ITS HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
Historically, oral argument occupied a fundamental role in the common 
law’s evolution.22 As the common law system developed in England, parties 
pleaded their case orally and judges rendered their decisions orally as well.23 
There was no formal time limit restricting the duration of hearings before the 
English Court of Appeals, and proposals for such constraints were rejected in 
the 1950s.24 Until the late 1900s, the concept of a written brief was completely 
alien to appellate adjudication in England.25 Beginning in the 1980s, the Eng-
lish Court of Appeals requested (but did not require) parties to submit a written 
document outlining the key points of the case prior to the hearing.26 The pri-
macy of oral argument in English law was justified on the basis of its deep his-
torical roots, cost-effectiveness, better engagement with the parties’ arguments, 
and capacity to promote judicial accountability.27 
In the United States, the practice of oral hearings before appellate courts 
was imported from England.28 The tradition of oral argument, however, devel-
oped very differently in the two countries. Written arguments occupied a far 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 21 See discussion infra Part V. 
 22 See David R. Cleveland & Steven Wisotsky, The Decline of Oral Argument in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 119, 125 (2012) 
(“Appellate practice in England was an overwhelmingly oral one from the early common law until the 
mid-twentieth century.”). 
 23 See DELMAR KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 98 (1963) 
(noting decisions are rendered orally and extemporaneously by the judges); Suzanne Ehrenberg, Em-
bracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1159, 1175 (2004) (observing that 
prior to the mid-nineteenth century, “[b]ecause the amount of written material relevant to the appeal 
was so small, it was read to the judges by counsel during the oral argument; no written materials were 
submitted in advance”). 
 24 See Ehrenberg, supra note 23, at 1176 (noting England rejected “the U.S. practice of written 
brief and limited oral argument” in the 1950s); Delmar Karlen, Civil Appeals: English and American 
Approaches Compared, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121, 131, 134–35 (1979) (discussing the lack of 
time limits). For a discussion of the oral argument process before the English Court of Appeal in the 
1980s, including its lack of time limits, see Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orallity and Visibility in the 
Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732, 740 (1983). 
 25 See Edson R. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure, 24 MICH. L. REV. 109, 125–26 
(1925) (“The most remarkable thing about the hearing of an English appeal is the total absence of 
written briefs . . . .”). 
 26 Ehrenberg, supra note 23, at 1177. 
 27 Id. at 1176–77. 
 28 Daniel J. Bussel, Opinions First—Argument Afterwards, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1194, 1207 (2014). 
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more central role in appellate adjudication within the United States compared 
to in England.29 As far back as 1795, the Supreme Court required the parties to 
submit a written document outlining the key points of the appeal.30 Short writ-
ten briefs were required as of 1821.31 Despite greater emphasis on written ar-
guments, oral hearings still formed a crucial part of the appellate adjudicative 
process. Until the mid-nineteenth century, oral hearings before the Supreme 
Court resembled the English appellate adjudication model, and there was no 
formal time limit on oral argument.32 When Gibbons v. Ogden was argued be-
fore the Supreme Court in 1824, the oral hearing lasted five days with four 
hours of oral argument per day.33 The United States v. Schooner Amistad case 
argued in 1841 involved eight days of oral argument.34 Time limits on oral ar-
gument were only formally imposed in 1849, when advocates were each ac-
corded two hours to plead their side of the case.35 
The frequency and duration of oral argument declined most significantly 
following the “explosion” of filings before federal appellate courts in the 
1960s.36 Today, only one quarter of cases heard by those courts receive an oral 
hearing.37 Advocates appearing before federal appellate courts are generally 
limited to fifteen minutes of pleading.38 The frequency and duration of oral 
argument before the Supreme Court has declined in a similar fashion.39 Since 
the 1970s, advocates appearing before the Court are each given thirty minutes 
of pleading time for oral hearings.40 In recent years, the Court’s docket has also 
shrunk.41 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Mark R. Kravitz, Written and Oral Persuasion in the United States Courts: A District Judge’s 
Perspective on Their History, Function, and Future, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 247, 250 (2009). 
 30 Id. at 251. 
 31 Id. 
 32 See R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century 
United States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482, 488 (1994) (“Throughout this period (the first half of the 
nineteenth century), oral argument was available to counsel in unlimited amount.”). 
 33 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35 
MERCER L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1984). 
 34 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841); Cleveland & Wisotsky, supra note 22, at 128. 
 35 Kravitz, supra note 29, at 252. 
 36 Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 3, at 1145. 
 37 Cleveland & Wisotsky, supra note 22, at 119–20. 
 38 Myron H. Bright, The Power of the Spoken Word: In Defense of Oral Argument, 72 IOWA L. 
REV. 35, 38 (1986); Hatchett & Telfer, supra note 4, at 140. 
 39 See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 
62, 63 (1985) (discussing changes in appellate adjudication). 
 40 Ryan C. Black et al., Toward an Actor-Based Measure of Supreme Court Case Salience: In-
formation-Seeking and Engagement During Oral Arguments, 66 POL. RES. Q. 804, 807 (2013). 
 41 Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1219, 1224 (2012). 
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The dynamics of oral argument and the justices’ conduct during hearings 
also changed significantly within the past several decades—a shift that was 
observable due to the rise of empirical studies of oral argument and adjudica-
tion.42 Barry Sullivan and Megan Canty conducted empirical research compar-
ing Supreme Court oral hearings from the October Terms of 1958 to 1960 and 
the October Terms of 2010 to 2012, and concluded that the Supreme Court 
justices became far more active in that latter period.43 Their research demon-
strates that the number of words spoken by advocates decreased by forty-six 
percent while the number of words spoken by the justices increased by about 
twenty-four percent during that time.44 
Tonja Jacobi and Matthew Sag’s empirical studies into Supreme Court 
hearings reveal similar tendencies.45 They evaluated whether the justices spoke 
more during oral argument after the year 1995—a year marked by growing 
political partisanship associated with Newt Gingrich’s election as speaker of 
the House of Representatives during the Republican Revolution.46 Jacobi and 
Sag conclude that since 1995, the Supreme Court panel as a whole spoke on 
average for thirteen minutes more per hearing—a shift that reduced advocates’ 
own pleading time.47 The justices spent roughly twenty-two percent more time 
speaking during oral argument after 1995 than before that same year, and the 
dynamics of their interactions changed as well.48 
Scholars describe contemporary oral hearings as “the new oral argument” 
whose core characteristic is an increasingly hot bench.49 Empirical research 
into the new oral argument demonstrates how the advent of a hot bench has 
transformed both oral hearings and the nature of the judicial role in significant 
ways. As part of the new oral argument, advocates speak less while judges 
speak more,50 female justices speak less while male justices speak more,51 the 
justices and the advocates (especially women) are interrupted more frequently 
than in the past,52 and judges’ questions more frequently advocate positions 
than seek information from the parties.53 Furthermore, the proportion of ques-
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2017, 2035–40 (2016) (detailing data collection efforts on the justices’ behavior). 
 43 See Sullivan & Canty, supra note 7, at 1019 (discussing research findings). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 8, at 1229–30 (noting an increase in words spoken by the justices 
during oral argument). 
 46 See id. at 1162–63 (discussing changes in the Supreme Court during the 1990s). 
 47 See id. at 1234. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See, e.g., id. at 1165; Sullivan & Canty, supra note 7, at 1038. 
 50 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 8, at 1234. 
 51 Id. at 1236. 
 52 Id. at 1240. 
 53 See id. at 1240, 1245. 
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tions that judges ask a party is a major factor that affects decision outcomes; 
the party who is asked the most questions is least likely to win its case.54 For 
that reason, Chief Justice Roberts remarked that “the secret to successful advo-
cacy is simply to get the Court to ask your opponent more questions.”55 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
A. Democratic Justifications for Oral Argument 
The pervasiveness of a hot bench in appellate adjudication raises crucial 
questions about the justifications for oral hearings and the role of appellate 
judges. Traditionally, democratic and functionalist justifications have been ad-
vanced for oral argument.56 First, some contend that oral hearings can promote 
important democratic values such as transparency, participation, and accounta-
bility, all of which can instill faith in courts as public institutions.57 According 
to that argument, oral hearings can further the appearance of justice and im-
prove the public’s confidence in the judiciary.58 For instance, Lon Fuller sug-
gests that oral hearings are valuable because they demonstrate that parties are 
given their day in court and can shape outcomes.59 Judith Resnik makes a simi-
lar argument and explains that historically, public hearings were often “specta-
cles of public power” that were used to instill fear and “command obedi-
ence.”60 The advent of democratic government and constitutionalism altered 
that dynamic.61 Those developments helped transform oral hearings into pro-
cedures where individuals openly demand that their rights are respected, judg-
es recognize and protect people’s interests, and courts check the state’s power 
in a public setting.62 
One limitation to those scholars’ positions is that they allude to a bygone 
era of oral argument that existed prior to the rise of the hot bench in appellate 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Lee Epstein et al., Inferring the Winning Party in the Supreme Court from the Pattern of Ques-
tioning at Oral Argument, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 456 (2010). 
 55 John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-Emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. 
CT. HIST. 68, 75 (2005). 
 56 See Martineau, supra note 16, at 11, 13 (discussing the purposes of oral argument). 
 57 See id. at 11 (detailing democratic rationales for oral argument). 
 58 See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 139 (2013) (citing “decreased oral argument” as a “threat to 
the judicial system”); Wasby, supra note 5, at 68 (noting oral argument is important for appearance 
purposes in the context of criminal cases). 
 59 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383–84 
(1978) (discussing the role of public hearings in the adversary process). 
 60 Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 774, 781 
(2008). 
 61 See id. at 785 (discussing the evolution of the justice system). 
 62 See id. (detailing the rise of public adjudication). 
2020] A Theory of Appellate Adjudication 1279 
adjudication.63 A hot bench raises concerns about whether oral hearings ad-
vance or hinder certain democratic values. Empirical research demonstrates 
that appellate judges can conduct themselves more like advocates than adjudi-
cators during oral argument.64 They may dominate oral hearings, assert posi-
tions that are consistent with their ideological views, and answer questions 
posed by their colleagues.65 Oral hearings may improve transparency, partici-
pation, and accountability in judicial decision making.66 But a hot bench also 
risks jeopardizing other democratic values, such as justice, fairness, participa-
tion, independence, political equality, and impartiality.67 
Suzanne Ehrenberg has a different view and questions the extent to which 
oral hearings truly encourage judicial accountability.68 She observes that the 
primacy of oral argument in English law is justified on that basis.69 In her 
view, the claim that oral hearings promote accountability mistakes accountabil-
ity in the decision-making process with accountability in the finality of deci-
sions.70 This leads Ehrenberg to conclude that “[i]t is only when a judicial de-
cision is fully reasoned and widely accessible to the public that the judiciary 
becomes truly accountable.”71 There are, however, two principal reasons why 
oral hearings promote judicial accountability, despite the apparent legitimacy 
of judges’ written decisions. 
First, oral hearings promote a different form of judicial accountability 
even where judges’ written decisions are fully reasoned and accessible to the 
public. One can imagine a situation where a judge’s conduct during oral argu-
ment destroys any appearance of impartiality, fairness, or legitimacy of his or 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See ALAN PATERSON, FINAL JUDGMENT: THE LAST LAW LORDS AND THE SUPREME COURT 39 
(2013) (noting judges are better prepared for oral hearings, which results in a hot bench). 
 64 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 8, at 1166. 
 65 See id. at 1168–78 (discussing the behavior of Supreme Court justices during oral argument); 
Timothy R. Johnson & Ryan C. Black, The Roberts Court and Oral Arguments: A First Decade Ret-
rospective, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 137, 141–48 (2017) (same). 
 66 See Resnik, supra note 60, at 783–84 (noting modern justifications for public proceedings). 
 67 See Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology, and 
Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1483 (2017) (discussing factors 
that correlate to interruptions by the justices); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 213–14 
(1971) (discussing civil liberties). 
 68 See Ehrenberg, supra note 23, at 1195 (“Accountability is a myth if one is able to see the judg-
es reach a decision, but is not able to understand the reasoning process that led to the decision.”). 
 69 See id. (discussing the English oral tradition). 
 70 See id. (“The accountability rationale for the oral tradition . . . ‘confuses the ability to see a 
process in action with accountability for the result of that process.’”) (quoting ROBERT J. MARTI-
NEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 118 (1990)). 
 71 Id.  
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her written decision.72 Yet in isolation, the publicly accessible written decision 
may be fully reasoned and evince those qualities. The judge would be held ac-
countable primarily through public scrutiny of (and complaints about) his or 
her conduct during the hearing and not through the strength of the reasoning 
contained in his or her written decision.73 Much like how judicial recusal rules 
hold judges accountable for appearances of impropriety, oral hearings hold 
judges accountable for conduct that puts the legitimacy of their written deci-
sions or judicial role into question.74 
A second reason why oral hearings hold judges accountable is because of 
the trouble in assessing judicial candor and judges’ true reasoning processes.75 
It is difficult to know whether judges’ written decisions truly constitute an 
honest and sincere account of how the case was decided.76 For that reason, 
stakeholders look beyond the substance and appearance of written decisions. 
They evaluate judges’ questions and conduct during oral hearings to determine 
whether written reasons seem honest and transparent and whether judicial be-
havior demonstrates fairness and impartiality.77 Both oral hearings and written 
decisions play a role in maximizing judges’ accountability in different but con-
nected ways.78 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See, e.g., ELAINE CRAIG, PUTTING TRIALS ON TRIAL: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE FAILURE OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 200 (2018) (discussing a sexual assault trial where, from the judge’s conduct, 
it appeared that the victim, rather than the alleged assailant, was on trial). 
 73 See id.; Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1357 
(1995) (discussing judicial duties in the context of oral or written opinions). 
 74 See Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1566 
(2012) (noting judges are obligated to “recuse themselves when their impartiality can be reasonably 
questioned, not only when it is rightly questioned”). 
 75 See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737–38 (1987) 
(discussing judicial candor and noting that judges themselves “disagree about how decisions are 
reached”). 
 76 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265, 2269 
(2017) (observing that “[a] number of skeptical observers specifically maintain that a crucial, material 
omission in many Supreme Court opinions involves the Justices’ failure to indicate the role that their 
moral, political, or policy views may have played in their decisionmaking”). 
 77 See David A. Karp, Note, Why Justice Thomas Should Speak at Oral Argument, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 611, 626 (2009) (arguing that Justice Clarence Thomas’s penchant to remain silent during oral 
argument raises due process concerns). 
 78 See Kravitz, supra note 29, at 263–64 (noting oral hearings contribute to “visibility and ac-
countability”); Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 
SW. L.J. 1151, 1154 (1981) (noting the “visibility of oral confrontation between counsel and judge 
lends virtue to the legal system”); Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as 
Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 766 (2006) (observing that oral hearings “provide[] 
the public with an opportunity to witness, and therefore monitor, a portion of the court’s decisional 
process”). 
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B. Functionalist Justifications for Oral Argument 
The second principal justification for oral argument is that it serves a 
functional purpose.79 As Robert Martineau explains, judges use oral hearings 
to grasp the core issues of a case, clarify ambiguities contained in the written 
brief, and address new questions that might be necessary to resolve an ap-
peal.80 He also explains that some judges assimilate verbal information better 
than written information.81 Myron Bright points out that oral arguments 
strengthen judges’ confidence in the decision-making process, by allowing 
them to evaluate the strength of parties’ arguments in open court.82 Former 
California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk explains how oral argument 
counteracts cognitive bias, because the parties can influence judges’ tentative 
views about a case—a position with which several former and current Supreme 
Court justices agree.83 Judge Mark Kravitz, formerly of the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Connecticut, notes that verbal exchanges may be capable of 
conveying emotions and the gravity of a case’s implications in ways that writ-
ten decisions cannot.84 Ryan Black, Timothy Johnson, and Justin Wedeking 
have demonstrated that because appellate judges do not discuss tentative case 
outcomes prior to oral hearings, they use oral argument to build coalitions, de-
spite their individual disagreements and competing ideologies.85 David Cleve-
land and Steven Wisotsky describe how oral argument is capable of engaging 
decisionmakers through the process of dialogue in ways that written reasons 
cannot.86 Finally, Jay Tidmarsh contends that oral arguments can produce bet-
ter law by orienting judges towards more optimal outcomes and helping them 
avoid bad decisions.87 
There are some important limitations to the functionalist argument. It 
generally assumes that advocates contribute constructively to oral hearings, 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Martineau, supra note 16, at 13 (discussing functional justifications). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Bright, supra note 38, at 38. 
 83 See BRIAN LAMB ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT: A C-SPAN BOOK FEATURING THE JUSTICES 
IN THEIR OWN WORDS 111, 139, 203 (2010) (interviewing current and former Supreme Court justices 
who explain that oral argument can change their tentative view on a case); Stanley Mosk, In Defense 
of Oral Argument, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 25, 27 (1999) (noting oral hearings permit “[a] justice 
[to] challenge his own temporarily formed opinion about the case by probing questions pro and con on 
the position he may have in mind”). 
 84 Kravitz, supra note 29, at 267–68. 
 85 RYAN C. BLACK ET AL., ORAL ARGUMENTS AND COALITION FORMATION ON THE U.S. SU-
PREME COURT: A DELIBERATE DIALOGUE 60 (2012). 
 86 See Cleveland & Wisotsky, supra note 22, at 124 (commenting on the value of oral hearings). 
 87 See Jay Tidmarsh, The Future of Oral Argument, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 475, 479–80 (2016) 
(discussing arguments on both sides regarding the virtue of oral hearings). 
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clarify issues, and improve decision outcomes.88 But this is not always the 
case.89 Judge Ruggero Aldisert, formerly of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, is candid about advocates’ shortcomings during oral hearings: 
some are unprepared, avoid directly engaging with appellate judges’ questions, 
address too many issues, or focus too much on the periphery.90 The functional-
ist claim can overlook both the quality of information that advocates produce 
during oral hearings and the quality of advocates themselves.91 Martineau sug-
gests that in some cases, it would be better if parties could simply submit sup-
plemental briefs that address judges’ initial concerns instead of holding oral 
hearings.92 
The functionalist claim also tends to assume that judges will use oral 
hearings to acquire information and produce better decisions.93 But what about 
the reality of cold benches?94 Judges might arrive at hearings unprepared, ask 
irrelevant questions, or allow advocates to recite their brief.95 The functionalist 
argument also assumes that judges gather accurate information during oral ar-
gument. Some researchers have demonstrated that judges can base decision 
outcomes on incorrect information contained in amicus curiae briefs.96 It is 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Stephen L. Wasby, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument: Some 
Views of Lawyers and Federal Judges, 65 JUDICATURE 340, 344–45 (1982) (discussing instances in 
which judges and advocates find oral hearings helpful). 
 89 See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, Chandler v. Miller: Double Indemnity, in A GOOD QUARREL: AMER-
ICA’S TOP LEGAL REPORTERS SHARE STORIES FROM INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 110, 112 (Timothy 
R. Johnson & Jerry Goldman eds., 2009) (discussing an oral argument where the petitioner was com-
pletely unprepared). 
 90 See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT 
358–59 (2d ed. 2003) (suggesting how to prepare for oral argument). 
 91 See Ehrenberg, supra note 23, at 1164 (arguing “judges are better able to understand and deter-
mine the merits of an argument made in writing as compared with one that is delivered only orally”). 
 92 See Martineau, supra note 16, at 29 (proposing a process where parties submit written briefs 
followed by an oral hearing or other information-gathering process if the judge decides the briefs are 
inadequate or contain ambiguities that require clarification). 
 93 See Wasby, supra note 88, at 344–45 (noting oral arguments reveal to the judge where the 
parties stand on core issues, which allows for faster disposition of “peripheral” issues). 
 94 See Shirley M. Hufstedler, The Appellate Process Inside Out, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 20, 24 (1975) 
(noting “[c]old benches are those [in] which the court is introduced to the case through oral argu-
ment”); Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV. 
255, 267 (1975) (noting “some judges go on the bench ‘cold’ with no advance preparation”). 
 95 See Jason Vail, Oral Argument’s Big Challenge: Fielding Questions from the Court, 1 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 401, 407 (1999) (observing that “[s]ometimes, a judge will persist with a series of 
questions that does not seem relevant”). 
 96 See, e.g., Ryan Gabrielson, It’s a Fact: Supreme Court Errors Aren’t Hard to Find, PROPUBLICA 
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/supreme-court-errors-are-not-hard-to-find [https://
perma.cc/U6TH-MFLS] (discussing an opinion in which Justice Samuel Alito cited an erroneous statistic 
from an amicus brief); John Pfaff, The Supreme Court Justices Need Fact-Checkers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/supreme-court-justices-factcheckers.html 
[https://perma.cc/9ZQJ-VTZE] (“[M]any amicus briefs include false or unsubstantiated empirical 
assertions, at least some of which make it into justices’ opinions.”).  
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plausible that flawed information presented in hearings adversely shapes deci-
sion outcomes as well.97 
One might also question the extent to which functionalism succeeds 
where judges use oral argument to advocate positions instead of gathering in-
formation.98 For instance, in the recent case Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the issue before the Su-
preme Court was whether the mandatory payment of agency fees from non-
consenting public sector employees violated the First Amendment.99 In re-
sponse to an affirmation by respondent, the Solicitor General of Illinois, re-
garding the state’s managerial interests with respect to unions, Justice Kennedy 
interrupted and asserted: 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: [The union] can be a partner with you in ad-
vocating for a greater size workforce, against privatization, against 
merit promotion, against—for teacher tenure, for higher wages, for 
massive government, for increasing bonded indebtedness, for in-
creasing taxes? That’s—that’s the interest the state has?100 
Justice Kennedy later asked whether unions will exert less political influence if 
the respondents lost the case.101 When the respondent confirmed that Justice 
Kennedy’s assertion was correct, Justice Kennedy responded: “Isn’t that the 
end of this case?”102 Needless to say, he voted against the respondents. The 
functionalist claim can overstate the virtues of traditional oral hearings while 
minimizing the vices of a hot bench and the drawbacks of the new oral argu-
ment. 
Finally, oral argument’s function is generally construed as an advocate-
centric adversarial process where parties shape outcomes through their argu-
ments.103 That view tends to discount how judges use oral argument to influ-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Garrett Epps, When the Supreme Court Doesn’t Care About Facts, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/when-the-supreme-court-doesnt-care-
about-facts/554354/ [https://perma.cc/EZ4H-MXBP] (discussing assertions made during oral argu-
ment in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees that were not sup-
ported by the facts); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1480 (2011) (arguing “[b]iased advocates will sometimes suppress useful in-
formation, and in some cases, the advocacy system will stimulate too much (possibly redundant) re-
search”). 
 98 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 8, at 1163 (observing that “justices are now arguing positions 
rather than querying advocates”). 
 99 See 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018). 
 100 Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466). 
 101 Id. at 54. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See Mosk, supra note 83, at 27 (discussing the effect of oral argument on a judge’s delibera-
tive process); William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 289, 300 (1986) (describing 
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ence their colleagues through questions posed to the advocates.104 For instance, 
Sullivan and Canty point out that judges use advocates as intermediaries to 
advance their own views.105 Johnson and Black observe that oral hearings at 
the Supreme Court have shifted from being a conversation between the advo-
cates mediated by the justices, to a conversation between the judges mediated 
by the advocates.106 
Supreme Court Justices Kennedy and Scalia have also remarked on how 
oral argument serves as a collective conversation between appellate judges 
where advocates are playing an increasingly minor role.107 More recently, Jus-
tice Kagan explained that “part of what oral argument is about is a little bit of 
the justices talking to each other with some helpless person standing at the po-
dium who you’re talking through.”108 In a similar vein, Chief Justice Roberts 
stated in a 2008 speech that “[q]uite often the judges are debating among 
themselves and just using the lawyers as a backboard.”109 The functionalist 
argument can therefore fail to capture how oral hearings have become increas-
ingly judge-centric and how justices may shape outcomes through their inter-
ventions during oral hearings. These emerging realities in turn generate broad-
er questions about the democratic justifications for oral argument and judges’ 
role in a democracy. 
Some scholars and judges are more critical of the functionalist purpose of 
oral hearings for other reasons.110 Judge Aldisert contends that written briefs are 
                                                                                                                           
oral argument as “an essentially collegial function” and “one of only two occasions on which the 
judges get together to consider the case”). 
 104 See Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 67, at 1396 (discussing the justices’ use of questions and 
statements during oral argument to persuade each other); James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, 
Source of Information or “Dog and Pony Show”?: Judicial Information Seeking During U.S. Supreme 
Court Oral Argument, 1963–1965 & 2004–2009, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 100 (2010) (same). 
 105 See Sullivan & Canty, supra note 7, at 1038 (“One possible explanation for the seemingly 
increased emphasis on oral argument as a venue for persuading one’s colleagues is that the Justices 
may now see interactions at oral argument as a substitute for the deliberation or discussion that could 
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 106 Johnson & Black, supra note 65, at 140 (“Part of what has led the oral argument conversation 
from a conversation between Justices and attorneys to a conversation between the Justices themselves 
is Roberts’ leadership style on the bench.”). 
 107 See Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 67, at 1396 (citing comments by Justices Kennedy and 
Scalia). 
 108 Adam Liptak, A Most Inquisitive Court? No Argument There, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/us/inquisitive-justices-no-argument-there.html [https://perma.
cc/T24Q-K9RR]. 
 109 Adam Liptak, Are Oral Arguments Worth Arguing About?, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/sunday-review/are-oral-arguments-worth-arguing-about.html [https://
perma.cc/66XS-QYSA]. 
 110 See, e.g., Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Appellate Bar: Professional Responsibility and Profession-
al Competence—A View from the Jaundiced Eye of One Appellate Judge, 11 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 455 
n.25 (1982); Martineau, supra note 16, at 14–15. 
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far more persuasive than oral argument.111 In his view, it is “self-evident” that 
ninety-five percent of cases are decided by written briefs rather than oral argu-
ment.112 But, interviews with Supreme Court justices,113 anecdotal evidence,114 
and the empirical research described above in Part II all contradict his claim.115 
Martineau asserts that written briefs are better at articulating complex ideas 
compared to oral arguments.116 In his words, “[i]t simply flies in the face of 
common sense that the transitory, spontaneous, and soon forgotten oral statement 
can communicate an idea better than a carefully prepared brief that can be stud-
ied as long as necessary.”117 Martineau’s position, similar to Judge Aldisert’s 
observations, was advanced before the advent of empirical studies analyzing the 
information that judges produce during oral hearings.118 Understandably, he does 
not address empirical research showing that oral hearings can promote judicial 
accountability in ways that written briefs cannot.119 As the new oral argument 
continues to evolve, so too does the new judicial accountability. 
III. DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES OF A HOT BENCH 
There are, therefore, conflicting views about the democratic and function-
alist justifications for oral argument. The new oral argument, the rise of the hot 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Aldisert, supra note 110, at 455 n.25 (noting “[t]he appellate brief is far more important 
than oral argument”). 
 112 Id. at 456. 
 113 See LAMB ET AL., supra note 83, at 111, 139, 203. 
 114 See Myron H. Bright & Richard S. Arnold, Oral Argument? It May Be Crucial!, 70 A.B.A. J. 
68, 68–70 (1984) (discussing the importance of oral argument to a judge’s decision-making process). 
 115 See Timothy R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands 
with Questions at Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 244 
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and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 274 
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 116 See Martineau, supra note 16, at 14–15 (noting the drawbacks of oral hearings). For a critique 
of Martineau’s view, see Bright, supra note 38, at 43–44. 
 117 Martineau, supra note 16, at 15. 
 118 See id. at 13–17 (omitting discussion of empirical studies); see also LAWRENCE S. 
WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT 74–75 (2006) (discussing empirical stud-
ies); Phillips & Carter, supra note 104, at 91–94 (discussing empirical studies). 
 119 See Cleveland & Wisotsky, supra note 22, at 138 (noting “[o]ral argument serves an important 
institutional and public function that is not provided by written submissions . . . [and] provides public 
visibility and institutional legitimacy”). 
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bench, and the dawn of empirical studies into judicial behavior raise new ques-
tions about whether oral argument truly furthers democratic and functionalist 
values. Those questions can only be answered by first exploring the core dem-
ocratic and functionalist virtues of active oral hearings: the capacity to promote 
transparency, judicial accountability, dialogue, and judicial minimalism. 
A. Transparency 
Transparency is generally associated with democracy because the public 
can evaluate, assess, and criticize political institutions that impact their lives.120 
Greater transparency may also improve the public’s understanding of decision 
making, reduce arbitrariness, and facilitate the identification of improper mo-
tives.121 Historically, tyrannical state practices—such as those associated with 
the Star Chamber in Sixteenth Century England—involved a notorious lack of 
transparency exemplified by in camera hearings.122 Transparency therefore 
gives outsiders better insight into the conduct, motivations, and practices of insti-
tutional insiders.123 Active oral hearings promote openness and transparency in 
the following ways. 
First, the more judges speak, the more unfiltered and candid insight they 
provide into their own thought processes, constitutional vision, grasp of the 
case at hand, knowledge of precedent, and understanding of their role in a de-
mocracy.124 Because so many aspects of judges’ decisional processes are 
shrouded in secrecy, their conduct and questions during oral argument are cru-
cial to the appearance of justice and public confidence in courts.125 Appellate 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2009) 
(discussing accountability in democracies). 
 121 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT 
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 123 See Ann Florini, Introduction to THE RIGHT TO KNOW: TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN 
WORLD 1, 5 (Ann Florini ed., 2007) (defining transparency). 
 124 See Neil D. McFeeley & Richard J. Ault, Supreme Court Oral Argument: An Exploratory Analy-
sis, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 52, 54 (1979) (“Since oral argument is the only stage of the Court's proceedings 
where the justices’ thought processes are publicly illuminated, it seems natural to include some analysis 
of participation in this phase to develop accurate portraits of individual judicial behavior.”). 
 125 See Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 696 
(1980). 
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judges deliberate in private to insulate themselves from external influence and 
pressure.126 Their memoranda, draft decisions, and preliminary views about 
cases are confidential.127 Law clerks may have a sense of their judge’s evolv-
ing view of a case, but the clerks are sworn to secrecy.128 Though judges’ writ-
ten decisions are public, they render decisions collectively and their drafts are 
refined over time, a fact that reduces transparency to some degree.129 
Second, oral hearings provide insight into appellate judges’ thought pro-
cesses that other accountability mechanisms, such as confirmation hearings, 
simply cannot.130 If judges communicated their actual views during the con-
firmation process, it may jeopardize their appointment and raise concerns of 
bias in future cases.131 Former Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner puts it 
more bluntly: “[j]udicial confirmation hearings have become a farce in which a 
display of candor would be suicide.”132 
Third, the greater transparency afforded by a hot bench is important, be-
cause many parts of the adjudication process are delegated to court staff and 
law clerks.133 Staff attorneys screen appellate briefs, comment on their substan-
tive merits, and draft memorandum opinions.134 Each Supreme Court justice 
used to have two law clerks.135 Now, the justices have four law clerks each, 
and many law clerks draft decisions.136 Artemus Ward and David Weiden sug-
gest that Supreme Court justices sometimes accept law clerks’ draft opinions 
without any changes, and the decision is then released under the justice’s 
name.137 In many contexts, the extent of staff attorneys and law clerks’ in-
                                                                                                                           
 126 See Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1100 
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 127 See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. 
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 134 See Oldfather, supra note 78, at 770 (outlining screening procedures). 
 135 WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 128, at 57. 
 136 Id. at 212–26. 
 137 Id. at 225–26. 
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volvement in the drafting process varies per judge and is not revealed to the 
public.138 
Fourth, the transparency inherent to a hot bench allows stakeholders to 
assess whether active judges are competent, because judges provide a public 
account of their understanding of legal norms and the case at hand.139 Unlike 
silent judges, active judges engage in a spontaneous exchange of ideas in 
which they put their thinking, experience, and engagement on display for all to 
evaluate.140 The way that judges speak during oral argument also allows the 
public to evaluate their perceived impartiality, fairness, and independence—all 
of which affect faith in courts as public institutions.141 
Lastly, a hot bench is also vital because a range of constraints limit trans-
parency in other parts of the adjudicative process. As the Supreme Court rec-
ognized in United States v. Nixon, deliberative secrecy is integral to judicial 
independence and the separation of powers.142 The private nature of judicial 
deliberations allows judges to candidly explore different avenues to resolve 
disputes immune from external pressure and scrutiny from the other branches 
of government.143 Deliberative secrecy also fosters candid debate, because 
judges’ discussions are protected from public scrutiny and external judgment 
that can influence decision making.144 Similar rationales justify the confidenti-
ality afforded to jury deliberations.145 A hot bench therefore grants greater 
transparency into judges’ reasoning processes without sacrificing the more 
confidential aspects of adjudication that promote judicial independence. 
The fact that a hot bench provides greater transparency into judges’ 
thought processes, however, does not mean that transparency should be pro-
moted more than other democratic values. One can imagine a situation where a 
hot bench completely monopolizes a hearing to the point that the parties cannot 
make their case. Though such a hearing would provide greater transparency into 
judicial reasoning, it would undermine other equally important democratic val-
                                                                                                                           
 138 See id. at 201 (noting the opinion-writing process “has changed over time, with justices ceding 
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ues, such as fairness and participation in the decision-making process.146 A hot 
bench can therefore sacrifice some democratic values in the pursuit of others. 
B. The New Accountability 
A hot bench also has the capacity to promote appellate judges’ accounta-
bility.147 Accountability is crucial in a democracy.148 Because members of the 
different branches of government exercise power over the polity, democracy 
requires oversight and control over their decisions, conduct, and reasons for 
action.149 Accountability measures therefore aim to provide a check on the dif-
ferent branches of government in order to prevent abuses, impropriety, and 
actions that are contrary to the public interest and the common good.150 
Appellate judges exercise a unique form of power in a democracy. They 
perform more than an error-correcting function—they create and develop the 
law.151 Their rulings generate profound impacts on the most politically divisive 
matters that shape everyday society: reproductive rights,152 affirmative action 
policies,153 gun rights,154 and even presidential elections, to name a few.155 Ap-
pellate courts’ power also stems from their counter-majoritarian power and 
ability to overrule the will of democratically elected representatives of the 
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1290 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1271 
people.156 Appellate judges protect vulnerable minorities against the tyranny of 
the majority and act as a bulwark against arbitrary decision making.157 They 
also benefit from a unique form of independence. They are nominated and 
cannot be held accountable through the electoral process.158 They can only be 
removed from office through impeachment for severe impropriety or criminal 
conviction.159 Their decisional independence is safeguarded by the security of 
tenure, salary, and confidential deliberations, while their institutional inde-
pendence is protected by their freedom in agenda-setting and budgetary alloca-
tion.160 Appellate judges must be held democratically accountable while hold-
ing the other branches of government accountable.161 
Scholars observe that judicial accountability is not limited to formal over-
sight measures, such as judicial codes of conduct,162 judicial councils that in-
vestigate and sanction unethical behavior,163 financial disclosure statutes,164 
legislation restricting judges’ out-of-court activities and remuneration,165 and 
the duty to provide publicly available reasoned decisions.166 Accountability 
also extends to informal mechanisms that shape judicial conduct, the judici-
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ary’s status, and judges’ decision-making processes.167 Informal accountability 
measures include public scrutiny and criticism of courts by stakeholders—
measures that can affect public confidence in the judiciary and negatively im-
pact its perceived legitimacy.168 Public confidence in courts is crucial, because 
judges cannot impose their will on others through decree—judges require sup-
port from the public and the other branches of government to ensure compli-
ance with judicial decisions.169 As Charles Geyh observes, courts are also held 
accountable through “the court of public opinion.”170 
A hot bench furthers accountability by exposing negative or questionable 
judicial conduct and incentivizing judges to change it.171 Jacobi and Sag’s re-
search analyzed the evolution of Supreme Court justices’ interactions during 
oral argument.172 They noted a shift in the type of dialogue since the Republi-
can Revolution: judges increasingly make comments or statements that stake 
out their positions as opposed to asking questions with the goal of gathering 
information.173 Jacobi and Sag’s research shows that judges who are opposed 
to a party’s position are more likely to ask them harder questions.174 Judges 
also generally ask more questions to parties whom they disfavor and against 
whom they will eventually vote.175 Empirical research also shows that judges 
tend to interrupt colleagues when they are ideologically opposed to their col-
leagues’ views.176 Lastly, Jacobi and Schweer’s research demonstrates the fol-
lowing trends: (1) conservative justices tend to interrupt liberal justices more 
often than the reverse,177 (2) male justices tend to interrupt female justices 
more often than the reverse,178 and (3) conservative male justices tend to inter-
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 168 See Geyh, supra note 160, at 164 (arguing “that if members of Congress responded to an un-
popular ruling in an ongoing case with scathing criticism . . . [, that criticism] could interfere with the 
judge’s capacity to remain impartial and apply the rule of law for the duration of the case”). 
 169 Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evi-
dence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019 (2004). 
 170 Geyh, supra note 160, at 164. 
 171 See Gavison, supra note 161, at 1619–20 (noting “critical responses by society or social 
groups . . . may affect, in a diffuse way, the status of the judicature, their decisions, and their conduct 
generally”). 
 172 Jacobi & Sag, supra note 8, at 1203. 
 173 See id. at 1203–04 (discussing findings). 
 174 See id. at 1172. 
 175 See id. (detailing how “justices pose more challenging comments and questions of the side that 
they ultimately oppose”). 
 176 See id. at 1210 (noting “judicial interruptions of more than one second are indicative of con-
flict and are predictive of significantly higher levels of disagreement between the interrupting justices-
pair in the eventual outcome”). 
 177 Jacobi & Schweers, supra note 67, at 1472. 
 178 Id. at 1458. 
1292 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1271 
rupt liberal female justices more often than the reverse.179 Though individually 
problematic, the aggregate effect of these changes raises fundamental ques-
tions about the nature of Supreme Court justices in a democracy and whether 
oral argument furthers democratic values.180 For instance, gendered interrup-
tions undermine political equality.181 Fairness and impartiality are put into 
question when judges only interrupt and grill parties against whom they are 
ideologically opposed.182 The democratic value of participation is hindered 
when judges monopolize oral hearings.183 
The study and broad dissemination of empirical research into oral argu-
ment can hold judges accountable for their conduct in two principal ways. 
First, empirical studies reveal anti-democratic tendencies or biases of which 
judges themselves may be unaware, allow for public scrutiny of those tenden-
cies, and ultimately, require judges to provide a public account of their behav-
ior. Different stakeholders—academics, lawyers, the media, and even Supreme 
Court justices—have drawn attention to these shifts in the dynamics of oral 
argument.184 Empirical research demonstrating judicial monopolization of oral 
hearings and the rise of gendered interruptions has garnered media attention 
and public criticism of the new oral argument.185 During recent public appear-
ances, Supreme Court justices were asked to explain how the Court is address-
ing gendered interruptions that were revealed by Jacobi and Schweer’s empiri-
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cal research of oral arguments.186 Associate Supreme Court Justices Sotomayor 
and Ginsburg also acknowledged that they are aware of that research.187 Simi-
larly, in an interview during the 2018 Federal Judicial Conference, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts acknowledged that he read the results of those studies and ex-
plained that he is attempting to address that problem.188 
Second, recent empirical research allows stakeholders to evaluate whether 
judges are actually responding to the democratic problems revealed by studies 
of oral argument. For instance, Justice Sotomayor remarked that Jacobi and 
Sag’s research led male justices to apologize to their female colleagues and 
generated a positive change in court dynamics.189 Justice Roberts, for his part, 
explained that he is attempting to act as a better referee, reduce interruptions, 
and ensure that advocates answer questions asked by justices who were inter-
rupted.190 It remains to be seen whether those measures will prove successful 
in counteracting judicial behavior that goes against certain values that are im-
portant to democracies. Scholars, however, are watching. Jacobi and Adam 
Feldman’s ongoing empirical research projects examine whether judges are 
effectively addressing negative tendencies that arise during oral argument.191 
As part of the new judicial accountability, it is plausible that judges will in-
creasingly be required to provide public accounts of their undesirable conduct 
and their efforts to correct it. 
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C. Dialogue 
A hot bench also has the capacity to promote dialogue between the differ-
ent branches of government by allowing them to collectively develop the law 
and interpret the scope of the Constitution. Many scholars have drawn a con-
nection between dialogic conceptions of judicial review and democracy.192 
“Dialogue theory” (or dialogic theory) provides a metaphor that describes the 
institutional dynamic between the distinct branches of government in the pro-
cess of judicial and constitutional review.193 It alludes to how the branches of 
government develop the law through interactive processes that aim to respect 
the separation of powers, despite the counter-majoritarian difficulty.194 Within 
the past half-century, dialogue theory—and its different conceptions—has 
gained popularity within the United States and abroad.195 As described more 
below, however, dialogue theorists generally tend to overlook the role of oral 
argument in promoting certain democratic values and developing the law. 
1. Partnership Conceptions of Dialogue 
Scholars such as Kent Roach, Peter Hogg, and Allison Bushell have ad-
vanced a “partnership” theory of dialogue premised on the “rejection of both 
judicial and legislative supremacy.”196 According to that theory, courts retain 
significant counter-majoritarian power, yet the legislature can “limit, modify, 
or override” certain constitutional rights or judicial interpretations of those 
rights.197 Certain provisions of Canada’s constitutionally entrenched bill of 
rights—the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter)—
are said to promote partnership dialogue between the three branches of gov-
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ernment.198 Section 33 of the Canadian Charter provides the renowned “Not-
withstanding Clause,” which allows the legislature to enact a statute that ex-
pressly overrides or limits the normal application of certain constitutional 
rights or courts’ interpretation of those rights for a five year period.199 Dia-
logue also takes place when courts provide delayed declarations of constitu-
tional invalidity that suspend the law’s application for a period of time, thereby 
allowing lawmakers time to fashion reactive legislation that observes the Ca-
nadian Charter’s requirements.200 
The Supreme Court of Canada has expressly endorsed the partnership 
conception of dialogue as a core aspect of the country’s constitutional structure 
and as a viable account of the interaction between the branches of govern-
ment.201 In 1998, in Vriend v. Alberta, the Supreme Court of Canada remarked 
that democracy necessarily extends beyond democratically elected popular 
will.202 The Court ruled that dialogue allows different branches of government 
to hold one another accountable and protect democratic values that are placed 
at risk in the majoritarian process.203 As the majority of the Court explained, 
dialogue promotes democracy by ensuring that lawmakers respect constitu-
tional rights and the underlying democratic values that are tied to those rights: 
human dignity, political equality, respect for individuals and groups, and public 
confidence in institutions.204 
Some, such as Guido Calabresi and Michael Perry, have suggested that 
judicial supremacy and the counter-majoritarian difficulty could be mitigated if 
the United States Constitution contained something similar to the Canadian 
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Charter’s Notwithstanding Clause.205 Without such an amendment, though, 
scholars have argued that a strong application of the partnership theory of dia-
logue is less plausible in American law for two reasons.206 First, instead of re-
jecting both legislative and judicial supremacy, American law has expressly 
recognized judicial supremacy as far back as Marbury v. Madison and in sub-
sequent cases.207 Second, the U.S. Constitution lacks a constitutionally en-
trenched override clause.208 The closest thing that Congress has to an override 
clause is the power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts.209 Though 
Congress can restrict that jurisdiction, it cannot restrict the scope of constitu-
tionally entrenched rights or judicial interpretations of those rights.210 
2. Deliberative Conceptions of Dialogue 
Others advance a deliberative conception of dialogic theory.211 According 
to “deliberative” dialogic theories, judicial supremacy does not undermine a 
meaningful dialogue between the three branches of government and the public 
at large.212 Barry Friedman argues that the focus on judicial supremacy ob-
scures how the enforcement of court decisions requires public support and co-
operation from the legislative and executive branches.213 Even if the judiciary 
is supreme, dialogue is both necessary and inevitable to ensure that judicial 
decisions are enforced, respected, and legitimized.214 Neal Devins and Louis 
Fisher share that view, and note that courts lack the power to secure obedience 
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through the power of the purse and command of the military.215 Because judi-
cial decisions are often politically controversial, courts are required to adjudi-
cate in a fashion that minimizes the risk of political and societal instability.216 
For this reason, scholars and courts have observed that the judiciary must se-
cure obedience to its decisions through reason and explanation, not through 
fiat or decree.217 
The deliberative conception of dialogue theory aims to promote democra-
cy through the judiciary’s communication, engagement, and involvement with 
a broad range of stakeholders with shared and conflicting interests.218 Along 
the lines of Friedman’s dialogic account, the deliberative process looks some-
thing like this:219 first, some form of governmental action—usually the enact-
ment of a law or some administrative agency’s decision—impacts one or many 
individuals’ rights and interests.220 Those individuals then challenge the law or 
the decision through judicial or constitutional review.221 The parties to the dis-
pute advance their adversarial understanding of the law, the constitution, the 
scope of certain rights, and the limit of state power.222 As the dispute winds its 
way up the court system, different actors become involved in the judicial pro-
cess.223 Civil society groups, experts, and amici curiae contribute their 
knowledge about how the decision risks impacting a broad range of inter-
ests.224 The media becomes involved and explains the stakes of the case to the 
general public.225 Individuals debate the potential impact of the court’s deci-
sion and what it means for society at town hall meetings, around the nation’s 
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watercoolers, over dinner, and on social media.226 Because courts are attentive 
to public opinion, they too are concerned with the scope of their decisions and 
the need for input from diverse stakeholders.227 The dialogic process intensi-
fies once the Supreme Court renders its decision.228 At that point, the societal, 
institutional, and political responses to the Court’s ruling are put into mo-
tion.229 Some of those responses aim to clarify, limit, or defy the Court’s hold-
ing.230 This leads to new legal disputes which, down the road, require renewed 
judicial intervention.231 Over time, the deliberative democratic process repeats 
itself over and over again.232 
Deliberative dialogic theory therefore captures how dialogue is not mere-
ly a collaborative institutional interaction between representatives of the dif-
ferent branches of government.233 Allison Young argues that individuals and 
groups become involved within the broader conversation between courts and 
lawmakers in a manner similar to what Friedman describes.234 By communi-
cating interests and concerns that risk being overlooked in the majoritarian 
process, individuals and groups exert pressure on the different branches of 
government to take minority interests into account when making decisions.235 
In Young’s view, that process shapes institutional behavior, as public institu-
tions aim to anticipate and avoid negative reactions from the other branches of 
government and society at large.236 
3. Oral Argument and Dialogue Theory 
Though there are exceptions, both partnership and deliberative dialogue 
theorists tend to overlook the role of oral hearings in the dialogic process. That 
oversight is natural for some partnership theorists who are primarily concerned 
with the interaction between courts and legislatures, responses to one another’s 
decisions, and the law’s incremental development as a result of inter-
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institutional dialogue.237 The Canadian Charter’s Notwithstanding Clause and 
delayed declarations of invalidity are both macro-level institutional processes. 
Deliberative dialogue theorists, on the other hand, are generally con-
cerned with the diffuse involvement and input of stakeholders with different 
interests throughout the adjudicative process.238 Yet they do not generally con-
sider how oral argument involves an important degree of dialogue and demo-
cratic deliberation that cannot take place in other parts of the adjudicative pro-
cess. Kent Roach explains that a key aspect of constitutional dialogue occurs 
during hearings.239 As a form of active constitutional dialogue, a hot bench can 
promote certain democratic virtues that cold benches generally cannot. 
First, active oral hearings allow judges to publicly demonstrate recogni-
tion and respect for the core values that partnership dialogic theories recognize 
as fundamental to a democracy.240 For instance, as Fuller argues, active oral 
hearings can foster respect for persons, human dignity, and trust in courts as 
institutions, because public deliberation shows that courts take individuals’ 
interests seriously and that parties can shape decision outcomes.241 
Active oral arguments allow judges to publicly demonstrate that they are 
considering minority interests that risk being overlooked in the majoritarian 
legislative process. For instance, during the oral argument in Obergefell v. 
Hodges—where the Supreme Court recognized the right to same-sex mar-
riage—the respondents on behalf of the State of Michigan argued that legisla-
tures should decide the definition of marriage instead of courts.242 At that hear-
ing, counsel for the respondents contended that there were serious consequenc-
es to delinking the connection between procreation and marriage and extend-
ing its scope to same-sex couples.243 In response to a statement by the re-
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Note that Lawrence Friedman also explores the role of informal dialogue between citizens within a 
constitutional order. Friedman, Constitutional Value, supra, at 116. 
 238 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 233, at 152 (arguing the judicial process takes into account pub-
lic opinion); Friedman, supra note 194, at 655–58 (discussing the ways in which numerous stakehold-
ers contribute to the dialogue through the judicial process). 
 239 See Roach, supra note 200, at 240. 
 240 See Vriend, 1 S.C.R. at 565–67 (discussing the importance of dialogue between the legislature 
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 241 Fuller, supra note 59, at 364, 372, 383–84. 
 242 Transcript of Oral Argument at 37–38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 12-
556) [hereinafter Obergefell Oral Argument]. 
 243 See id. at 43–49. 
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spondent’s advocate about the importance of procreation to marriage, Justice 
Kennedy interjected: 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that—that assumes that same-sex cou-
ples could not have the more noble purpose, and that’s the whole 
point. Same-sex couples say, of course, we understand the nobility 
and the sacredness of the marriage. We know we can’t procreate, but 
we want the other attributes of it in order to show that we, too, have 
a dignity that can be fulfilled.244 
During the oral argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, the justices also publicly demonstrated that they were tak-
ing minority interests into account.245 In that case, Colorado’s Civil Rights 
Commission ruled that a cake-maker discriminated against a same-sex couple 
by refusing to make them a custom wedding cake.246 The cake-maker argued 
that being required to produce the cake violated his right to free speech and the 
Free Exercise Clause, because it constituted a form of compelled speech that 
went against his religious beliefs.247 During oral argument before the Supreme 
Court, the justices were visibly concerned about the implications of recogniz-
ing the creation of a cake as a form of constitutionally protected speech.248 The 
justices voiced their concerns that doing so might allow individuals to refuse to 
serve minority groups on the grounds that it amounted to compelled speech or 
infringed the Free Exercise Clause.249 During the hearing, Justice Breyer high-
lighted the potential impact of such recognition on marginalized individuals 
and groups, stating: 
JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Now, the reason we’re asking these 
questions is because obviously we would want some kind of distinc-
tion that will not undermine every civil rights law from the—from—
from the year [two]—including the African Americans, including 
the Hispanic Americans, including everybody who has been dis-
criminated against in very basic things of life, food, design of furni-
ture, homes, and buildings.250 
                                                                                                                           
 244 Id. at 49. 
 245 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–19, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Masterpiece Cakeshop Oral Argument] 
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 246 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1722–24. 
 247 Id. at 1726. 
 248 See Masterpiece Cakeshop Oral Argument, supra note 245, at 11–14 (posing hypotheticals 
about what other products would receive protection if cakes were deemed to be protected expression). 
 249 Id. at 18–19. 
 250 Id. 
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The second way that a hot bench can promote certain democratic values 
through dialogue is by publicly engaging with opposing viewpoints about how 
statutes and the Constitution should be interpreted. During oral hearings, judg-
es take part in a dialogue with advocates representing the executive or legisla-
tive branches. Appellate judges inquire about the scope of each branch’s power 
and seek input about whether courts should defer to their will.251 Such interac-
tions can further democracy for several reasons. 
For one, judges can demonstrate fidelity to the separation of powers, rec-
ognize the role and expertise of the other branches of government, and show 
that they strive to exercise their counter-majoritarian power judiciously.252 
Judges take part in democratic deliberation at oral argument, by stating their 
understanding of precedent, the Constitution, and their own power, while al-
lowing advocates representing the other branches of government to challenge 
or refute those conceptions.253 
During oral argument, appellate judges ask representatives of the different 
branches of government to provide an account of the legitimate scope of their 
powers or the extent of their constitutional duties. In Citizens United v. Federal 
Exchange Commission, Justice Alito asked counsel representing the Commis-
sion about how far the Government could go in limiting speech and inquired: 
JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think the Constitution required Congress 
to draw the line where it did, limiting this to broadcast and cable and 
so forth? What’s your answer to Mr. Olson’s point that there isn’t 
any constitutional difference between the distribution of this movie 
on video demand and providing access on the Internet, providing 
DVDs, either through a commercial service or maybe in a public li-
brary, providing the same thing in a book? Would the Constitution 
permit the restriction of all of those as well?254 
                                                                                                                           
 251 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 
17-965) (“JUSTICE KENNEDY: And your argument is that courts have the—the duty to review 
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 254 Id. at 26–27. 
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A hot bench also allows representatives of public institutions and individ-
uals to collectively attempt to resolve tensions about the legitimate scope of 
state power and the breadth of constitutional rights. During the oral hearing in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kagan asked the Solicitor General about where 
the Court should draw different constitutional lines in an effort to balance free 
speech, freedom of religion, and equal protection.255 The following exchange 
took place: 
JUSTICE KAGAN: General, it—it seems as though there are kind 
of three axes on which people are asking you what’s the line? How 
do we draw the line? So one axis is what we started with, like what 
about the chef, and the florist— 
GENERAL FRANCISCO: Speech, non-speech. 
JUSTICE KAGAN: A second axis is, well, why is this only about 
gay people? Why isn’t it about race? Why isn’t it about gender? 
Why isn’t it about people of different religions? So that’s a second 
axis. And there’s a third axis, which is why is it just about wed-
dings? You say ceremonies, events. What else counts? Is it the fu-
neral? Is it the Bar Mitzvah or the communion? Is it the anniversary 
celebration? Is it the birthday celebration?256 
No public dialogue takes place between individuals and the different branches 
of government when the bench is cold or judges are silent during oral argu-
ment. Though a cold bench might engage in metaphorical conversation with 
the other branches of government in their written decisions, a hot bench can 
engage in actual public dialogue—and public deliberation—with the other 
branches.257 
Lastly, a hot bench can impose strong informal norms on judges that 
serve to promote democracy. Alexander Bickel famously argued that different 
formal norms constrain the judicial role and restrict the issues that courts can 
decide, such as standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine.258 As 
Cass Sunstein points out, informal norms—such as the need to reduce error, 
ensure obedience to judicial decisions, and avoid unnecessary political contro-
versy—also limit the role of courts and the issues that judges decide.259 
Written submissions and oral hearings ensure that judges do not decide is-
sues spontaneously but rather limit themselves to issues advanced by the par-
                                                                                                                           
 255 See Masterpiece Cakeshop Oral Argument, supra note 245, at 33–35. 
 256 Id. at 33–34. 
 257 See Roach, supra note 200, at 240. 
 258 See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1961). 
 259 See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV 4, 6–7 
(1996). 
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ties.260 Empirical research also demonstrates that roughly eighty percent of 
Supreme Court decisions reflect arguments advanced by the parties in their 
written briefs and during oral hearings.261 
Active oral argument helps ensure that judges do not take adjudicative 
paths or adopt theories never advanced by or presented to the parties.262 As 
David Karp explains, where silent judges adopt untested theories that parties 
did not have the opportunity to confront, it can suggest that judges are using 
the case before them as an excuse to impose their constitutional vision on soci-
ety.263 Karp points out that Justice Thomas has issued a series of dissenting 
opinions that would undo established case law principles despite not having 
asked the parties questions that would allow them to challenge his views.264 
Active oral hearings thus create an additional normative link between the ar-
guments advanced by the parties and judicial decisions—a connection that 
aims to ensure that judges do not overstep their role within a constitutional 
democracy or act as policymakers in robes. 
D. Judicial Minimalism 
Finally, a hot bench has the capacity to promote the democratic virtues of 
judicial minimalism—a theory of adjudication advanced by Cass Sunstein that 
implies that judges “decide no more than they have to decide.”265 Judicial min-
imalism offers an account of how judges adjudicate complex and politically 
divisive matters despite not being democratically accountable like other 
branches of government.266 Sunstein contends that appellate judges who must 
decide controversial cases aim to respect the separation of powers by issuing 
narrow rather than broad holdings and appealing to “shallow rather than deep” 
                                                                                                                           
 260 Timothy R. Johnson et al., Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 349, 353 (2005). 
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principles.267 He posits that judicial minimalism promotes democracy by en-
suring that the democratically accountable branches of government make cer-
tain types of decisions, because those branches possess expertise and resources 
that courts lack.268 Other branches of government can then respond to those 
decisions and resolve complex political issues through the democratic pro-
cess.269 Judicial minimalism is said to foster the separation of powers by allow-
ing the different branches of government to incrementally and collectively de-
velop the law through a dialogic process.270 
As Sunstein explains, judicial minimalism is valuable because it can help 
judges reduce the risks of error attributable to more ambitious theories of adju-
dication.271 In his view, maximalist theories of adjudication can misfire due to 
judges’ inability to anticipate new facts and foresee the unintended conse-
quences of their decisions.272 Judicial minimalism also promotes coalition 
building by allowing judges with ideologically and politically diverse views to 
agree on low-level theories that are less likely to produce serious errors.273 
One of the most significant ways that a hot bench promotes judicial min-
imalism and democracy is through hypothetical questions posed to the advo-
cates.274 Judges ask advocates hypothetical questions that test out tentative le-
gal theories and limiting principles.275 Through that process, appellate judges 
are reminded of what they do not know and cannot predict. They become 
aware of how ambitious theories of adjudication and broad holdings might 
open the floodgates to a range of unexpected consequences.276 For instance, in 
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Masterpiece Cakeshop, the justices asked a series of hypothetical questions to 
test the potential consequences of recognizing the provision of certain goods or 
services as a form of protected speech.277 During the following exchange, Jus-
tice Ginsburg asked about where the line between conduct and expression 
should be drawn: 
MS. WAGGONER: The artist speaks, Justice Ginsburg. It’s as much 
Mr. Phillips’s speech as it would be the couples’. And in Hurley, the 
Court found a violation of the compelled speech doctrine. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Who else then? Who else [is] an artist? Say 
the—the person who does floral arranging, owns a floral shop. 
Would that person also be speaking at the wedding?278 
Justice Kennedy, for his part, asked hypothetical questions about the discrimi-
natory consequences of refusing to provide same-sex individuals with certain 
services on the ground that it amounted to compelled speech: 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: If you prevail, could the baker put a sign in 
his window, we do not bake cakes for gay weddings?279 
Responses to hypothetical questions can lead to two types of responses 
that are at the core of judicial minimalism: narrowing and levelling-down.280 
Recognizing that expansive holdings can result in major errors and unforeseen 
consequences, appellate judges are pushed towards crafting decisions with nar-
rower rulings.281 Cognizant of the perils of committing to high-level theoriza-
tion and abstract principles upon which judges and society reasonably disa-
gree, they level-down their theorization and abstraction to avoid unnecessary 
political controversy and needless mistakes.282 
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IV. FUNCTIONALIST VIRTUES OF A HOT BENCH 
A. Gathering Information 
The previous Part discussed how a hot bench can advance certain values 
that are important to democracy. This Part shows how active oral hearings can 
also promote certain functionalist values that cold benches and silent judges 
cannot.283 It argues that a hot bench allows appellate judges to optimally exer-
cise their limited information-gathering capacity that characteristically restricts 
the quantity and quality of information they can use to decide cases. 
1. Appellate Courts’ Limited Information-Gathering Capacity 
The three branches of government each have to make decisions. And they 
have to make different types of decisions. The legislature decides which laws 
to pass. The executive branch decides how laws and policies are applied. Judg-
es decide legal disputes between parties that arise from the interpretation of 
laws. There are many salient features that distinguish the three branches of 
government from one another and limit their respective powers. This Section 
focuses on one such distinctive feature recently highlighted by Sunstein: the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches’ different information-gathering 
capacities.284 
As Sunstein points out, the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment have the latitude and freedom to acquire data and expertise from many 
different sources and can do so over an extended period of time.285 In a bicam-
eral system, both legislative chambers gain knowledge and information 
through the use of specialized committees and subcommittees.286 Prior to en-
acting legislation, lawmakers consult with legal drafting professionals, policy 
experts, analysts, agencies, regulators, and other specialists.287 They attempt to 
gain better insight about the risks and potential consequences of legislation by 
speaking to those who possess relevant expertise and knowhow that they them-
selves lack.288 Through this process, lawmakers are better able to ensure that 
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the diversity of the population’s interests and needs are taken into account in 
the legislative process.289 
In terms of information-gathering abilities and means, the executive 
branch operates differently. It has the greatest proximity to, and familiarity 
with, the daily application of laws.290 Agencies and regulators’ staff are com-
prised of highly specialized and knowledgeable bureaucrats and technocrats.291 
They are insiders. They are most acquainted with the agency’s inner workings 
and amass information by interacting frequently with the general public and 
relevant stakeholders.292 For example, bureaucrats at a worker’s compensation 
board read countless reports about workplace injuries and communicate with 
those who suffer those injuries on a daily basis. Bureaucrats rely on internal 
policies and guidelines about how to interpret and implement particular poli-
cies and they use those guides on a frequent basis. They are well-apprised of 
the general public’s confusion about certain regulations. They consult with col-
leagues and managers who share similar expertise and experience.293 They un-
derstand how certain laws or policies may impact the agency’s daily function-
ing and the interests of the general public. 
The executive branch has access to a broad wealth of information from 
both the public and private sectors.294 Agencies and regulators often enlist the 
assistance of those that they regulate as a means to amass more information 
and gain a diversity of perspectives.295 The legislative and executive branches 
of government also benefit from a particular luxury that the judiciary lacks. 
Not only can lawmakers and agencies amass a tremendous amount of 
knowledge and information, but they are not required to act on it—they can 
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avoid enacting some law or proceed with some policy if the risks are unclear 
or excessive.296 Judges must decide the cases that they hear. 
2. Optimizing the Use of Limited Information 
As Sunstein remarks, the judiciary’s information-gathering capacities—
and appellate judges’ information-gathering capacities in particular—are far 
more limited both in time and scope compared to other branches of govern-
ment.297 Appellate judges can only rely on certain sources of information when 
deciding a case. And the information they have access to is incomplete, imper-
fect, and prone to error.298 
Because of the adversarial nature of an appeal, the parties present incom-
plete or limited information that will persuade judges to arrive at the outcome 
that the parties desire.299 Information that weakens a party’s argument, or that 
is fatal to its position, is often omitted or downplayed as irrelevant, unim-
portant, or inconsequential by that party.300 The advocate’s mantra is simple: 
justices, this is what actually matters; this is what you must focus on.301 A par-
ty frames its appeal in a manner that attempts to control and mitigate a judge’s 
reliance on information that is harmful to that party’s position.302 
Appellate judges also sometimes rely on inaccurate or flawed information 
when deciding a case.303 If parties seek to adduce certain types of information 
at trial (e.g., data, statistics, or studies), that evidence is generally subject to an 
adversarial debate that attempts to ensure its accuracy, relevance, and probative 
value. Because the parties are motivated by specific outcomes, they have the 
incentive to challenge the admission of certain evidence that is adduced by the 
opposing party.304 That process supports the admission of more accurate, rele-
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2020] A Theory of Appellate Adjudication 1309 
vant, and probative evidence. But that process is still prone to error.305 Parties 
might not object to inaccurate or flawed information when they should. Ex-
perts make mistakes. New studies or information might disprove a theory or 
hypothesis that judges initially accepted as correct. In other cases, amici curiae 
present information that judges rely on but that turns out to be flawed, inaccu-
rate, or false.306 
Judges not only must rely on imperfect and incomplete information to 
render decisions, but also have few sources of information to consult in the 
process.307 In addition to the tools discussed above, judges can examine the 
factual matrix of the case before them, the material contained in the parties’ 
briefs, available doctrine and precedent, points raised by other members of the 
appellate panel, amicus curiae briefs, their law clerks’ opinions, and the argu-
ments advanced by the parties at oral argument.308 A hot bench allows judges 
to optimally exploit the few sources of information that are most responsive to 
their concerns. 
3. Counteracting the Effects of Time Constraints 
Active oral arguments aim to counteract two types of time constraints that 
appellate judges face: a limited window of opportunity to gather new infor-
mation, and restrictions on self-correction. Appellate judges are only able to 
gather information from the parties within a certain time period. A hot bench 
reads the party’s written submissions before the hearing and drills the parties 
with questions during oral argument. Once it ends and the case is reserved for 
judgment, the judges can no longer acquire new information from the parties 
through direct questioning—the ship has sailed. 
Admittedly, in many appeals, judges have a sense of how the case will be 
decided prior to oral argument.309 In those contexts, there may be less of a need 
to acquire information from the parties, because the appeal is dead on arrival. 
Other cases are different. The cases that make their way to higher courts tend 
to be notoriously complex. Consider, for instance, a complicated case that rais-
es questions of administrative law, constitutional law, and statutory interpreta-
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tion. At the close of oral argument, the judges may be unsure about which ap-
proach is necessary to best decide the case. It may be unclear which legal prin-
ciples will prevail, and furthermore, which information will eventually support 
their reasoning. During oral argument, appellate judges harvest information 
that can support diverse means of resolving the case and justify a range of out-
comes. A hot bench allows the judiciary to remedy a particular knowledge def-
icit: the uncertainty about which information and legal approaches will be em-
ployed to resolve a complex case. 
Appellate judges also use active oral hearings to probe prospective legal 
tests, principles, or potential outcomes in ways that generate few costs and re-
quire little commitment. The importance of a hot bench’s capacity to gather 
information is illustrated by the second type of time limitation that constrains 
the judiciary: restrictions on self-correction.310 
Lawmakers and members of the executive branch have a broad power of 
self-correction. They possess greater control over when and how to fix laws 
and policies that misfire. An appellate court’s opportunity for self-correction, 
however, is far more limited. Like everyone else, appellate judges make mis-
takes. They elaborate tests or principles that are unworkable, and they must 
rectify them at some later time.311 But for at least two reasons, judges cannot 
fix their own errors like other branches of government. 
First, appellate judges only decide the cases that wind their way through 
the judicial system and end up before their courts.312 It may take years before 
an appellate court is given the opportunity to rectify whatever unworkable tests 
or principles it previously established. Unlike other branches of government, 
judges’ opportunity for self-correction is far less proactive in nature. 
Second, even when courts have the opportunity to modify some legal test 
or principle that has generated unexpected problems, appellate judges face 
constraints that limit that opportunity for self-correction. Those constraints are 
imposed by the unique nature of the judiciary as a branch of government, a 
commitment to values that underlie the common law, and a respect for core 
adjudicative principles. Ronald Dworkin alluded to similar constraints in his 
theory of adjudicative integrity.313 “Adjudicative integrity” implies that judicial 
decisions can be understood as part of an intelligible unfolding narrative.314 
According to Dworkin, judicial decisions should embody a rational enterprise 
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that reflects the “best view of what the legal standards of the community re-
quired or permitted” and those legal standards should be “seen as coherent, as 
the state speaking with a single voice.”315 As part of that narrative, judicial de-
cisions that respect adjudicative integrity unite backwards-looking concerns 
about continuity with history and precedent, and forward-looking considera-
tions regarding the judge’s role in shaping the law within a democracy.316 
The concept of adjudicative integrity is exemplified by judges’ commit-
ment to crucial values and principles that promote stability in the legal system, 
protect expectations, and form the bedrock of common law adjudication. Those 
values and principles include stare decisis, res judicata, hierarchy between 
courts, treating like cases alike, functus officio, and the rule of law. True, one 
might reject the theory of adjudicative integrity espoused by Dworkin. Yet 
judges, scholars, and lawyers still accept the overarching role of those values 
and principles discussed above.317 In contexts where appellate judges are pre-
sented with an opportunity to correct or modify some recently developed legal 
test or holding, fidelity towards those principles and values militates towards a 
meaningful degree of judicial self-restrain.318 Save for exceptional cases, judg-
es are reluctant to fix their past errors if it comes at the expense of sacrificing 
important values, bedrock principles, or their own legitimacy.319 
Appellate courts rely heavily on oral argument to reduce the risk that their 
legal tests or principles will generate sweeping consequences or necessitate 
frequent revision.320 In cases that are inextricably intertwined with policy con-
siderations, some research demonstrates that appellate judges resolve those 
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cussed in conference).  
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cases by according significant importance to information that emerges during 
the hearing.321 Johnson’s research demonstrates that in nearly all Supreme 
Court cases involving policy considerations, the justices’ post-hearing confer-
ence focuses primarily on issues that arose during oral argument.322 Converse-
ly, in cases involving policy considerations, less than one percent of post-
hearing conferences rely exclusively on the parties’ written submissions.323 
B. Building Coalitions 
1. Avoiding Plurality Opinions 
There are further advantages to a hot bench. Notably, it assists appellate 
judges in building coalitions, drafting more intelligible decisions, and develop-
ing general principles upon which they can agree despite their ideological dif-
ferences.324 Consensus building is important because it allows appellate judges 
to avoid the problems associated with plurality opinions, meaning that their 
decision lacks a clear majority.325 Plurality decisions may fail to give lower 
courts guidance about applicable legal principles or how future cases should be 
decided.326 Lawyers and the general public may be confused about the deci-
sion’s outcome and holding.327 Plurality decisions may draw criticisms that 
appellate courts are abdicating their duty to decide cases, by issuing decisions 
with no clear conclusion or discernible test.328 Plurality decisions can also un-
dermine stare decisis by generating uncertainty about whether the court has 
established, abandoned, or modified some legal principle.329 For reasons like 
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these, Frank Easterbrook remarks that “[p]lurality decisions are subject to spe-
cial scorn.”330 
Oral argument is an important part of the coalition-building process, be-
cause Supreme Court justices generally do not know their colleagues’ views 
about a case prior to the hearing.331 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan 
observe that oral argument is the first time that individual justices are exposed 
to their colleagues’ views about a case.332 Some justices have confirmed in in-
terviews that there is an unwritten rule prohibiting them from discussing their 
views and tentative case outcomes with their colleagues before the hearing.333 
Justice Kennedy has explained that the prohibition exists to prevent the justices 
from lobbying one another without having first been exposed to the parties’ 
oral arguments.334 
There may be several advantages for appellate judges to use oral argu-
ment as the starting point in the coalition-building process instead of waiting 
until the post-hearing conference. For one, parties are afforded a public oppor-
tunity to address judges’ most pressing concerns and directly influence how 
majorities are formed. If a cold bench does not alert the parties to judicial con-
cerns, the parties lack a comparable opportunity. Furthermore, because judges’ 
time to deliberate in post-hearing conferences is already restricted, active oral 
hearings may be a more efficient avenue for judges to begin reaching majori-
ties.335 They can use oral argument to rally around decision outcomes, and then, 
use post-hearing conferences to candidly discuss issues that are less amenable to 
public debate or scrutiny.336 By using oral hearings to reach consensus on issues 
and case outcomes, judges offer a more candid display of their deliberative pro-
cesses and disagreements that would otherwise be hidden from examination.337 
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2. Signaling and Screening 
Active oral hearings may help judges develop majorities in several ways 
that cold benches or silent judges may not.338 First, a hot bench can build con-
sensus by mitigating asymmetric information problems.339 Before the hearing, 
each justice naturally knows more about his or her own views of the case than 
about those of his or her colleagues—there is an information asymmetry af-
fecting the justices.340 But the justices cannot share their views with colleagues 
before the hearing because of the unwritten rule that prevents such communi-
cation.341 Furthermore, Supreme Court protocol also forbids the justices from 
asking one another questions during oral hearings.342 The problem is that the 
justices must render decisions collectively despite information asymmetries 
and being unable to directly communicate their views to colleagues prior to the 
post-hearing conference.343 
During active oral hearings, judges reduce information asymmetries and 
build coalitions through signaling.344 According to “signaling” theory in eco-
nomics, when an individual possesses information that others lack and direct 
communication between them is impossible, the individual can telegraph that 
information to others.345 When individuals signal, they make the first move in 
remedying others’ information deficits.346 Judges engage in signaling by asking 
questions that telegraph issues they deem important, arguments they reject, 
policy preferences, and preferred outcomes.347 Through signaling, the justices 
                                                                                                                           
 338 See JOHNSON, supra note 320, at 58 (discussing a case where the views of other justices that 
arose during oral argument persuaded another justice to join their opinion). 
 339 Cf. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mech-
anism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (discussing asymmetrical information problems). 
 340 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Col-
legial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993). 
 341 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 85, at 7 (noting the justices do not discuss a case prior to oral 
argument). 
 342 Linda Greenhouse, Oblique Clash Between 2 Justices Mirrors Tensions About Abortion, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 30, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/30/us/oblique-clash-between-2-justices-
mirrors-tensions-about-abortion.html [https://perma.cc/Y2RC-EEF3]. 
 343 See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 340, at 7. 
 344 See BLACK ET AL., supra note 85, at 11–12, 19–20 (discussing coalition formation); EPSTEIN 
ET AL., supra note 7, at 309 (observing “[q]uestioning at oral argument also gives a judge an oppor-
tunity to signal colleagues who respect his superior expertise regarding a particular type of case”); 
Phillips & Carter, supra note 104, at 171. 
 345 See David M. Kreps & Joel Sobel, Signalling, in 2 HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY 850, 850–
66 (R.J. Aumann & S. Hart eds., 1994) (discussing signaling theory); Michael Spence, Job Market 
Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 355–57 (1973) (same). 
 346 Kreps & Sobel, supra note 345, at 861. 
 347 BLACK ET AL., supra note 85, at 11–12, 19–20 (discussing coalition formation). 
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learn which colleagues share similar views and can begin to reach consensus 
about the core issues of a case and potential avenues to resolve legal disputes.348 
Second, judges build coalitions by using oral argument as a screening de-
vice to avoid bad decisions and outcomes.349 The economic theory of “screen-
ing” aims to mitigate the costs of decisions that are made on the basis of im-
perfect data.350 Screening implies that individuals who lack information and 
wish to reduce error costs make the first move in seeking out more information 
from others.351 For instance, employers require applicants to submit their re-
sume and then use that information as a screening device to filter out less than 
ideal candidates.352 
Appellate judges use oral argument as a screening device precisely be-
cause they lack relevant information about the future impact of their deci-
sions.353 They generally cannot assess which factual situations will arise in the 
future, how their decisions will stand up against the evolution of technology or 
morality, how lower court judges will interpret their decisions, and how col-
leagues will apply their decisions in the future.354 Appellate judges resort to 
hypothetical questions as a screening device that mitigates those risks.355 
Those questions give judges insight into how tentative outcomes risk being 
interpreted in the future, the dangers of committing to some approaches versus 
others, and the likelihood that their decisions may backfire.356 
3. Judicial Minimalism and Coalition Formation 
Through signaling and screening, judges can build majorities around a 
shared acceptance of the need for judicial minimalism in certain cases. Even if 
appellate judges cannot initially agree about which approaches and outcomes 
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are best, they can far more easily agree about those that are very bad.357 They 
can reach consensus around a shared recognition that some adjudicative paths 
generate too much unpredictability, political controversy, and risks of error.358 
Judges reach majorities in part through a preliminary consensus about what not 
to do and how not to decide.359 Having screened out the most costly, divisive, 
and error-prone adjudicative paths, judges reach consensus by signaling their 
commitment to more minimalist approaches and outcomes. 
To illustrate this point, consider the justices’ line of questioning during 
oral argument in the Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion case and its impact on the Supreme Court’s decision. Throughout the first 
half of the hearing, the justices asked hypothetical questions screening the 
costs of recognizing the provision of certain services as a form of constitution-
ally protected speech.360 Those risks included the constitutional demise of pub-
lic accommodation laws that historically protected marginalized groups against 
discrimination.361 Through hypothetical questions, judges explored the unpre-
dictability associated with drawing a line between conduct and speech, as well 
as the complexity of reconciling religious freedom, free speech, and equal pro-
tection.362 
Mid-way through oral argument, Justice Kennedy signaled an alternate 
way of deciding the case to his colleagues.363 During an exchange with counsel 
for the respondent on behalf of the State of Colorado, Justice Kennedy asked 
about a statement by one of the commissioners of the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission that suggested bias against religion.364 Justice Kennedy signaled 
how the case could be resolved on the basis of the Commission’s lack of neu-
trality that vitiated the integrity of its decision: 
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose we thought that in significant part at 
least one member of the Commission based the commissioner’s 
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on—on—on the grounds that—of hostility to religion. Can—can 
your—could your judgment then stand?365 
That intervention proved to be a crucial turning point. The justices began 
to reach consensus by signaling their agreement with Justice Kennedy’s sug-
gestion. When counsel explained that the whole panel must be biased to dele-
gitimize the decision, Chief Justice Roberts challenged that claim.366 He stated 
that a biased decisionmaker can vitiate the Commission’s verdict by improper-
ly influencing a panel member’s colleagues.367 Justice Gorsuch asked whether 
a second commissioner was also biased by suggesting that individuals provid-
ing certain services should compromise their religious belief system.368 Justice 
Breyer inquired how the judiciary should craft a principled exception into the 
public accommodation law that both respects sincere religious beliefs and pre-
vents discrimination—ultimately conceding that he himself did not know 
where to draw such a line.369 Justice Alito asked a series of questions about the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s history of opposing certain religious 
viewpoints but not others.370 
Though the entire duration of those exchanges between the justices and 
the advocates lasted just over five minutes, it formed the basis of the majority’s 
opinion.371 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Kagan, Breyer, Alito, 
Gorsuch, and Thomas concluded that the Commission’s decision could not 
stand because its decisionmakers demonstrated hostility towards religion.372 
Despite their vast disagreements about the scope of free speech, freedom of 
religion, and equal protection, the justices reached a 7-2 majority. 
The Masterpiece Cakeshop decision and the justices’ approach in that 
case have both garnered criticism on various grounds that fall outside of the 
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intended scope of this Article.373 Yet the justices’ questions during the hearing 
and their ultimate decision illustrate how judges screen and signal to form ju-
dicially minimalist coalitions in hard cases—especially those involving com-
plex and divisive issues presenting heightened risks of judicial mistakes and 
political instability. 
V. OPTIMIZING DEMOCRATIC AND FUNCTIONALIST  
VALUES OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
This Article has advanced a theory about the connection between oral ar-
gument and appellate adjudication. Building on emerging empirical research, it 
has demonstrated how the changing nature of those hearings raises concerns 
about the justifications for oral argument and judges’ evolving role within a 
constitutional democracy. As Jacobi and Sag point out, judges are speaking 
more during oral hearings while advocates speak less, judges interrupt their 
colleagues and the advocates more than ever, and judges increasingly ask ques-
tions that resemble a form of advocacy rather than a form of inquiry.374 This 
Article has also showed how those changes put into question the traditional 
democratic and functionalist justifications for oral argument. Instead of satisfy-
ing those justifications, appellate judges may place those values and their own 
political legitimacy at risk. 
Despite the drawbacks to more active oral hearings, this Article has ex-
plained why there are some important democratic virtues inherent to the new 
oral argument and empirical studies into its evolution. Those democratic vir-
tues include greater transparency into judicial decision making, improved judi-
cial accountability, dialogue between different branches of government and 
stakeholders, and judicial minimalism. Moreover, the functionalist benefits of 
a hot bench show why active oral hearings carry some benefits that cold 
benches and silent judges do not. Those benefits include information-gathering 
that is more responsive to judicial concerns, coalition building through signal-
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ing and screening, and the formation of majorities around shared agreements 
about the need for judicial minimalism. 
It is, however, a mistake to conclude that active hearings will further 
some democratic and functionalist values simply because they have the capaci-
ty to do so. Indeed, this Article has demonstrated why a hot bench results in a 
form of paradox. In contrast to cold benches or adjudication based solely on 
written submissions, active oral hearings foster some democratic and function-
alist values while undermining others. 
For instance, the greater transparency afforded by the new oral argument 
undercuts the democratic value of participation by those most affected by the 
case.375 The rise of empirical research into oral argument provides a new form 
of judicial accountability that silent judges and cold benches escape. Yet in-
creased accountability has come at the price of sacrificing other values that are 
important to democracy. Judicial advocacy throws into doubt the appearance of 
fairness and impartiality, and generates deeper preoccupations about judges 
and judging.376 A hot bench also trades off certain democratic values against 
some functionalist values. Though judges may interrupt parties to gather in-
formation that is most responsive to their concerns, Jacobi and Schweers accu-
rately point out that gendered interruptions undercut the democratic value of 
political equality.377 
If judges wish to optimally satisfy the justifications for oral argument and 
maintain their legitimate role within a constitutional democracy, they must 
avoid the vices of the new oral argument and strive to uphold the core demo-
cratic and functionalist values inherent to appellate hearings. Achieving those 
ends requires both structural changes to oral argument and modifications to 
individual judges’ conduct. 
In addition to lengthening the duration of hearings (even marginally), Sul-
livan and Canty suggest that judges could provide advocates with a period of 
uninterrupted pleading time, perhaps at the onset and conclusion of their argu-
ments.378 This would allow advocates to shape the narrative of oral argument 
and summarily address judges’ most pressing concerns.379 Insulating a portion 
of advocates’ participation from judges’ questions and interruptions would de-
crease the incidence of democratic and functionalist trade-offs that are the 
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product of greater judicial activity. More recently, Supreme Court hearings 
have adopted this approach and allocate two minutes of uninterrupted pleading 
time at the onset of each party’s arguments.380 
Despite the potential benefits of such changes, appellate judges should go 
even further. They should ensure that they neither act like advocates nor exem-
plify the very adversarial qualities that are inimical to the sanctity of the judi-
cial function, especially in the nation’s highest courts of law. If judges truly 
seek to maximize some of the benefits of more active hearings without sacri-
ficing their perceived fairness and impartiality in the process, their interven-
tions must remain both judicious and judicial in nature. As much as judicial re-
straint constitutes a passive virtue in the process of adjudicating complex cases, 
it remains as important in the very hearings that serve as means to that end.381 
How could appellate judges maximize the functionalist and democratic 
values of oral argument in a manner that is consistent with greater judicial re-
straint? In addition to Sullivan and Canty’s suggestion described above, the 
associate justices of the Supreme Court could communicate their most pressing 
concerns about the case in writing to the Chief Justice prior to the hearing. The 
Chief Justice could then inform the advocates about the issues that the panel 
cares most about, and thus allow the parties to directly address those issues 
during oral argument. One advantage of such an approach is that it respects the 
convention that the justices do not discuss the case amongst themselves prior 
to the hearing. The proposal would also ensure that advocates’ arguments are 
most responsive to the justices’ core preoccupations. If implemented, it would 
not prevent the justices from asking the parties about new concerns that arise 
in the course of oral argument. 
On a more individual level, appellate judges must become aware of their 
own negative tendencies that scholars’ empirical research reveals. This can help 
them take the first steps to avoid acting in ways that are most at odds with the 
justifications for oral hearings and the judicial role.382 Like everyone else, judges 
have cognitive biases and engrained behaviors of which they are unaware.383 
The pioneering work of David Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrick 
demonstrates that exposing judges to certain information can help them override 
subconscious negative tendencies.384 Although more research is necessary, it is 
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 381 See Bickel, supra note 258, at 40 (discussing judicial restraint). 
 382 See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 8, at 1166 (discussing findings). 
 383 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (dis-
cussing findings of bias). 
 384 Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
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plausible that alerting judges to their predispositions might influence their con-
duct in future hearings. It remains to be seen whether the new judicial accounta-
bility will result in positive changes to oral hearings and a reduction in individual 
judges’ respective contributions to the vices of the new oral argument.385 
CONCLUSION 
 This Article explored the relationship between appellate adjudication and 
the new oral argument. It described potential democratic and functional ad-
vantages of such hearings. It also set out the inherent dangers to more active 
hearings, namely, that judges conduct themselves in a manner that is inconsistent 
with their role in a constitutional democracy and contrary to the purpose of oral 
argument. It explained why the disadvantages of the new oral argument may 
outweigh its advantages. 
Despite the competing advantages and drawbacks of a hot bench, one thing 
is certain. Active oral hearings and ongoing empirical research will continue to 
empower stakeholders to judge their judges in ways that written decisions and 
cold benches cannot. The new oral argument provides unparalleled infor-
mation—for better or for worse—about the evolving nature of oral argument and 
appellate judges’ role in a democracy. To the extent that a hot bench’s pursuit of 
certain goals seriously imperils judges’ perceived impartiality or the advocates’ 
participation during the hearing, members of the judiciary must avoid such un-
necessary and harmful trade-offs. The path towards improving oral argument 
resides—as it always has—in the passive virtues of appellate judges and their 
commitment to the core values that underpin democracy and justice. 
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